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SEC ENFORCEMENT ATTORNEYS: SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO? 
 
Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard* 
 
Date: January 2017 
 
Preliminary: not for quotation or citation 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the career paths of attorneys in the Enforcement Division at the SEC. Using 
a variety of performance metrics, we find evidence that long term lawyers and lawyers in 
regional offices do not perform as well as other SEC attorneys. We also report that men 
and women may differ in their career paths in this field. We find that early-stage female 
attorneys perform just as well as male attorneys. Notwithstanding their comparable 
performance, these early-stage women are less likely to get a raise or promotion. We find 
that women are more likely to stay at the SEC, at least at earlier points in their careers. We 
also find evidence that attorneys who perform well at the SEC are more likely to leave the 
agency, and that their destination is more likely to be a partnership at a law firm, 
contradicting the “revolving door” hypothesis. 
 
Keywords: SEC enforcement 
 
Data: publicly available, FOIA requests  
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1. Introduction 
 
 Numerous papers have studied the enforcement choices of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the impact of the agency’s enforcement actions, but 
little scholarly attention has been paid to the attorneys who do the actual work of the 
Enforcement Division. Those attorneys are responsible for conducting the investigations 
that lead to the filing of enforcement actions and for litigating those cases once they are 
filed. What are the incentives faced by those individuals? How do they perform? Who 
gets ahead at the SEC? Who leaves the SEC, and where do they go when they leave? 
Understanding the career patterns of SEC enforcement attorneys may shed light on their 
incentives. This paper attempts to begin filling this gap in the literature. 
 
 Our focus is on attorneys employed by the SEC’s Division of Enforcement in 
2004. We obtained the list of SEC Division of Enforcement attorneys from the SEC’s 
2004 Telephone Directory.1 Using publicly available information, as well as data 
obtained from the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED) project at NYU2 
as well as from the SEC through FOIA requests, we track their employment paths 
through June 2016. Using this sample, we evaluate a series of hypotheses relating to the 
career patterns of lawyers at the Enforcement Division.  
 
We look at the performance of attorneys in the Enforcement Division. We 
conjecture that long term attorneys stuck in the Division are likely to underperform. We 
find some evidence to support this “dead wood” hypothesis, with long term attorneys 
involved in fewer court cases, fewer cases brought against individuals, and fewer cases in 
which another regulator is involved. 
 
We also examine differences in performance between men and women employed 
in the Division. We find that women are less likely to be assigned to Rule 10b-5 cases. 
When we break this out, however, we find that the effect holds for females with 
management positions, but not for women who are staff attorneys or who have recently 
been employed in the Division. Recently hired female attorneys at the SEC take on cases 
similar to their male counterparts and produce similar results. Our other performance 
variables also show women lagging behind male counterparts, except for women who 
were recently hired and also those who are long term SEC employees. 
 
We also look at compensation patterns. Despite equivalent performance of 
recently hired female and male SEC attorneys, we find that recently hired male attorneys 
are more likely to get pay raises and promotions than female attorneys from 2004 to 
2014. We find no difference between men and women in the payment of bonuses 
measured in 2014. 
 
                                                 
1	Despite	our	best	efforts,	we	were	unable	to	find	SEC	Telephone	Directories	more	recent	than	the	
2004	edition.	
2	The	SEED	project	is	a	joint	venture	between	the	NYU	Pollack	Center	for	Law	and	Business	and	
Cornerstone	Research.	
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Our next set of tests looks at who stays at the SEC. We conjecture women may be 
more inclined to stay at the SEC relative to male counterparts because government work 
may offer a more manageable schedule that may fit better with greater family caregiving 
obligations. We further conjecture that attorneys who perform well at the SEC, as 
measured by the significance of the enforcement actions that they are involved in, will be 
less likely to stay at the SEC because their outside employment options will be more 
attractive. This hypothesis contradicts the “revolving door” hypothesis (Smallberg 2011), 
which posits that SEC attorneys will be inclined to pull their punches in bringing 
enforcement actions because it will enhance their job prospects when they depart for the 
private sector.  
 
We find that women are more likely to stay at the SEC, but this effect goes away 
for women who are long term SEC attorneys. Attorneys who work in the regional offices 
are also more likely to stay. We also find that attorneys who were partners in large law 
firms before coming to the SEC are more likely to depart, consistent with a credentialing 
hypothesis; attorneys from private practice go to the SEC for a limited time to gain 
experience as well as the imprimatur of having worked at the SEC. Consistent with our 
“anti-revolving door” hypothesis, we find that attorneys who perform well are more 
likely to leave the agency. Specifically, we find attorneys who are associated with the 
strongest enforcement cases as measured by the average number of civil court cases, the 
average number of 10b-5 court cases, the average number of court cases where there is 
another U.S. regulator involved, and the average number of court cases where an 
individual is targeted are more likely to depart. 
 
Our final set of tests looks at the landing spot for attorneys who choose to leave 
the SEC. We find that women are less likely to land positions as law firm partners or in 
the financial services industry relative to their male counterparts. This effect is mitigated, 
however, for women with more experience. We see that attorneys in regional offices are 
also less likely to leave for top-paying positions. By contrast, top managers are more 
likely to leave for these positions. Finally, we find that the strongest performers at the 
SEC are the attorneys most likely to land positions as partners in private practice after 
leaving the SEC. 
 
 We proceed as follows. Part 2 surveys the prior literature in this field and 
develops hypotheses. Part 3 describes our sample and our empirical tests. Part 4 provides 
a brief conclusion. 
 
2. Prior literature and hypotheses 
 
2.1 Prior literature 
 
 The existing empirical work on SEC enforcement looks at the outputs generated 
by the SEC’s enforcement work,3 focusing on sanctions imposed and consequences for 
companies and their officers when they are implicated in financial misconduct. Very little 
                                                 
3	For	an	overview,	see	Choi	&	Pritchard	(2016).	
4
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 127 [2017]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/127
Choi & Pritchard  Page 4 
 
empirical attention has been paid to the attorneys who do the actual work of the 
Enforcement Division. This dearth may in part reflect the limited availability of relevant 
data. The SEC does not disclose its investigations until an enforcement action is filed. 
Even then the attorneys responsible for the case will only be revealed if the case is filed 
in court and the attorneys are required to enter an appearance. If the enforcement action is 
pursued in an administrative proceeding, the SEC’s enforcement release may or may not 
reveal the names of the attorneys responsible for the action.4 
 
To date, the only substantial empirical work on SEC enforcement attorneys is 
DeHaan et al. (2016). They collect data on the career paths of SEC enforcement division 
lawyers involved in SEC cases involving accounting misrepresentations over the period 
1990-2007. They find minimal differences in the enforcement outcomes for “revolving 
door” lawyers that eventually leave the SEC to join law firms relative to other lawyers. 
However, the lawyers that leave to join law firms that specialize in defending clients 
against the SEC are associated with stronger enforcement effort, as proxied by higher 
damages collected, a higher likelihood of criminal proceedings, and a higher likelihood of 
SEC actions that charge the CEO. Overall, they conclude that the revolving door 
promotes more aggressive regulatory activity, rather than an attempt to curry favor with 
prospective employers. Their findings suggest that SEC attorneys are anxious to show 
their ability to promote their job prospects. 
 
This pattern is consistent with individuals viewing time spent working in 
government as an investment in human capital (Sauer 1998), offering an opportunity to 
specialize (NALP 2004). It is commonly understood that many attorneys will view 
experience at the SEC as a valuable credential, lending them credibility as white collar 
defense attorneys, conducting internal investigations, or serving as a legal advisor to 
firms in financial services subject to regulation by the SEC. The desire to bolster 
credentials may be reflected in their job performance. For example, Boylan (2005) finds 
that the length of prison sentences is positively related to subsequent career trajectories 
for U.S. Attorneys. In related work, Boylan & Long (2005) find that prosecutors in 
districts where private sector salaries are relatively high compared to government salaries 
are more likely to take cases to trial, which they attribute to a desire to gain relevant 
experience.  
 
Attorneys may vary in their motivation for working at the SEC. Some will be 
attracted to a career in public service, enjoying the opportunity to wear the “white hat.” 
(Weisbrod, 1983). Similarly, many will find the work of the SEC inherently interesting 
and challenging. For other lawyers, government employment may offer more manageable 
hours than the private sector. Some individuals will be willing to forego a bigger 
paycheck in exchange for more time for family or other obligations. Government lawyers 
report working fewer hours than their private sector counterparts (NALP 2004).  
 
                                                 
4	In	recent	years,	the	SEC	has	been	more	forthcoming	with	the	names	of	SEC	personnel	involved	in	an	
administrative	proceeding	in	its	news	releases.	We	leave	further	examination	of	SEC	personnel	
associated	with	administrative	proceedings	for	future	work.	
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A more manageable work/life balance may be particularly important to some 
woman, who choose to take on greater family caregiving obligations. Those obligations 
are commonly offered as reasons why the compensation and status of women in the legal 
profession trails that of men. The entry of women into the legal profession took off in the 
1970s (Rosen 1992) and women now represent roughly half of law school graduating 
classes. Equivalent numbers, however, have not necessarily translated into equivalent 
status in the profession or compensation, particularly in the private sector. Having 
children is more likely to depress women’s income in the private sector than in 
government (Dixon & Seron 1995), perhaps because women are less likely to become a 
partner in the largest law firms (Sterling & Reichman 2016). On average, female lawyers 
make 85% of what male lawyers earn (NALP 2009), a narrowing of a long standing 
disparity (Hagan 1990).  
 
Does gender influence career paths? Survey research indicates that women in the 
early portion of their careers are disproportionately represented in government legal 
positions (NALP 2004), but this differential is not found for federal government 
employment and narrows as lawyers get further into their careers (NALP 2009). Thus, 
having more women in lower-paid government employment may explain a portion of the 
overall gender gap in pay among lawyers noted above, but not all of it. Even among 
lawyers working for the federal government, women report earning 6% less pay than 
male lawyers (NALP 2009). This may reflect the fact that women employed as lawyers 
by the federal government report working fewer hours than their male counterparts 
(NALP 2009). It is unclear, however, if this reflects a choice by women to work fewer 
hours or supervisors giving them less substantive assignments. In this regard, it is worth 
noting that female attorneys working for the federal government report lower levels of 
job satisfaction than men (NALP 2009). 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
 
As discussed above, for some individuals, a stint at the SEC is a useful stepping 
stone to a more lucrative position in the private sector, the so-called “revolving door” 
studied by DeHaan et al. (2016). As discussed above, critics worry that this revolving 
door makes the staff of the SEC too cozy with the industry that it regulates. Defenders of 
the practice counter, however, that the possibility of moving to a lucrative position in the 
private sector down the road allows the SEC to attract better quality job candidates to the 
agency. Moreover, establishing a reputation for intelligence and energy in pursuing the 
SEC’s enforcement agenda may be a more marketable credential than an effort to curry 
favor with prospective employers. 
 
Not everyone, however, will succeed in translating their SEC experience into 
lucrative private sector employment. Some attorneys will stay at the SEC, not by choice, 
but because there are no private sector opportunities available to them. This possibility 
suggests a reverse selection effect, with the best lawyers leaving the agency for more 
lucrative opportunities, leaving the less ambitious behind (Goddeeris 1988). For these 
attorneys, it may be difficult to stay motivated in their work for the agency. As the years 
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pass, a reverse selection effect may manifest itself, with those remaining long term at the 
SEC being relative underperformers. 
 
H1: Long term SEC attorneys are likely to be enforcement underperformers.  
 
No a priori reason would suggest that men and women should differ in their 
performance as enforcement attorneys. Moreover, both law and government policy 
mandate that men and women be treated equally in the terms of their employment. All 
else equal we should expect women in the Enforcement Division to perform the same and 
be treated the same as their male counterparts. It is worth noting, however, that some 
literature suggests that woman lawyers may lag behind their male counterparts in 
receiving challenging assignments (Sterling & Reichman 2016), which may affect their 
performance and compensation. 
 
H2: Male and female attorneys will perform similarly and will be compensated 
similarly. 
 
Our next set of hypotheses relates to whether attorneys are likely to leave the 
SEC, and if they do, their destination. Based on our conversations with enforcement 
division attorneys, we speculated that men and women may follow different career paths 
at the SEC. In particular, some women may choose to take on greater family obligations 
in the middle of their careers relative to men, which may make the relatively manageable 
hours of a government job attractive. (Women just starting their careers may delay 
childbirth; women who have sent their children to college may have more time to devote 
to their careers.) Some women, however, may drop out of the labor market temporarily 
while their children are young, returning after they send their children to school. Their 
absence from the labor pool for a time may affect their opportunities for advancement.  
 
H3: Women attorneys with the least experience and the most experience will be more 
likely to leave the SEC than women in the middle of their careers. 
 
H4: Women attorneys will be less likely than men to leave the SEC for positions as 
law firm partners and with financial institutions. 
 
 As noted above, some will view service at the SEC as a credentialing device. 
These attorneys come to the SEC with the intention of returning to the private sector after 
a few years of service. Boylan (2004) shows that tenure in office for U.S. Attorneys is 
influenced by salaries available in alternative private sector employment. We predict that 
attorneys who have come to the SEC from lucrative private sector employment will be 
more sensitive to the pain of forgoing immediate income for government service, and 
thus, more apt to leave the SEC for more profitable employment.  
 
H5: Attorneys who leave partnerships with law firms to join the SEC will be more 
likely to leave the SEC for law firm partnerships. 
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  Our last hypothesis relates to the destination of attorneys who leave the SEC. 
Following DeHaan et al (2016), we posit that attorneys who are effective performers at 
the SEC will develop reputations that they can translate into highly-paid positions in the 
private sector. 
 
H6: SEC attorneys who are high performers will be more likely to leave the SEC  
for the private sector.  
 
 
 
3. Data and empirical results 
 
3.1 Sample 
 
Our sample consists of attorneys who worked in the SEC’s enforcement division in 
2004. We obtained the names of the employees of the Enforcement Division from the 
SEC’s 2004 telephone directory. We supplement this information with information about 
subsequent positions at the SEC through FOIA requests. These requests yielded employee 
names, job titles and grades, and postings, through 2014. We also collected pay grade 
information from federalpay.org that reports data obtained from the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management. We use this information to classify the attorney hierarchically. 
Our categories are as follows: 
 
Staff Attorney Employed by the SEC at SK-14 or below, who would be 
considered the entry-level attorneys. 
Top Manager Employed by the SEC at SK-17 and above. These attorneys 
typically have the title of Assistant Director, Assistant District 
Administrator, or Assistant Regional Director, or higher. 
The baseline category for comparison in our tests is all attorneys in SK-15 and 16. 
 
We also distinguish among the various SEC offices. We code attorneys as Regional 
if they are employed in an office other than New York or Washington, DC. Given the 
concentration of the financial services industry in New York, and the concentration of the 
white collar defense bar in Washington, attorneys in those offices may more private sector 
options than attorneys working in regional offices such as Fort Worth or Miami (Boylan 
2004). 
 
Using publicly available information, we track the employment choices of the 
attorneys in our sample through June 2016. We collected background information on the 
SEC attorney names through Internet searches, including the Martindale Hubbell dataset 
on LexisNexis, LinkedIn, and Google. These searches yielded information on prior and 
subsequent employment and when the individual started at the SEC. We use this 
background information to construct a number of variables relating to their employment 
subsequent to the SEC. We also create an indicator variable to reflect work experience 
prior to coming to the SEC: NLJ 250 Prior Partner, which is defined as 1 if the attorney 
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was a partner at one of the 250 largest law firms in the US before coming to the SEC. We 
conjecture that these attorneys are most likely to view experience at the SEC as adding a 
valuable credential. We posit that attorneys with prior government experience are more 
likely to see government employment as a long-term career path and may perform at a 
higher level as a result. To test the importance of prior government experience, we create 
the indicator variable Prior Gov Attorney. To test the importance of education (Rebitzer & 
Taylor 1995), we research the law school attended by the individual and their graduation 
year. We use the law school attended for our variable, Top Law School, which we define 
as the top 18 law schools as ranked by U.S. News in 1992.  
 
To help us understand how the work that these attorneys have done at the SEC 
influences their career patterns, we also collected the number of SEC civil enforcement 
cases against public companies in which these attorneys were involved from 2004 to 2015, 
which we used to calculate their average number of cases per year while at the SEC (Any 
Cases). Our source for this data is the complaints for SEC civil actions against public 
companies obtained from the SEC’s website, from Bloomberg Law, or from the SEED 
database. For each complaint, we recorded the names of the SEC attorneys listed at the 
bottom of the complaint. Our approach is underinclusive in that we do not track SEC 
attorney involvement in actions involving private companies or administrative 
proceedings. Prior to 2010, the SEC did not regularly list the attorneys involved in SEC 
administrative proceedings. Our focus on public companies allows us to focus on those 
attorneys that get the highest profile cases at the SEC. The downside of this approach is 
that it does not include cases such as insider trading and pump-and-dump schemes, which 
will primarily involve individuals. 
 
For the period 2004 to 2015, we also collected detailed information about 
enforcement actions in which violations of Rule 10b-5 were alleged. For actions involving 
public companies, Rule 10b-5 actions requires proof of scienter and thus we conjecture are 
more serious cases of fraud and that the highest performing attorneys at the SEC will be 
assigned to them. We computed the average number of Rule 10b-5 cases per year in which 
an attorney was involved (10b-5 Cases). All else equal, a higher number for this variable 
suggest greater involvement enforcing against substantial fraud. More serious cases may 
attraction the attention of multiple regulators, so we create the variable Other Government, 
which is the average number of cases per year from 2004 to 2015 against public companies 
in which another regulator, such as DOJ or a state attorney general, also brought an action 
against the company. We also create the variable Individual Actions, which is the average 
number of cases per year from 2004 to 2015 against public companies in which an 
individual was also named as a defendant. Naming an individual may indicate that the 
Division has taken a tougher stance in settling a potential enforcement action. Finally, we 
create the variable Officer Resignations, which is the average number of cases per year 
from 2004 to 2015 against public companies in which an officer of the company was 
terminated or resigned as a result of the enforcement action. 
 
We classify attorneys who started in 1990 or earlier as Long Term (corresponding 
to attorneys with 15 years or more experience as of the end of 2004). We classify attorneys 
who started in 2000 or later as Short Term (corresponding to attorneys with five years or 
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less of experience at the SEC as of the end of 2004). We use the Short Term category to 
examine the career patterns for the relatively recent hires at the SEC as of 2004. The 
baseline category is attorneys who started between 1991 and 1999. 
 
We also construct variables relating to compensation and promotion. We obtained 
data on compensation and employment position at the SEC from www.federalpay.org 
which reports pay data from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. We calculate the 
average base pay change for the attorneys for each year from 2004 to 2014 (or the last 
year the SEC attorney was employed at the SEC if earlier than 2014) as a percentage of 
their prior base salary (Average Base Pay % Change). We calculate Bonus Ratio as the 
bonus in 2014 (or last year at SEC) divided by base pay in 2014 (or base pay in last year 
at SEC). Finally, we code Promotions Rate, which is the average number of ranks the 
SEC attorney is promoted per year from 2004 to 2014 or the last year the SEC attorney 
was employed at the SEC if earlier than 2014. Variable Definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 We first look at the status of the attorneys in our sample as of 2004 in Panel A of 
Table 1. The average attorney had 13.9 years of experience and is approximately 40 years 
old. Nearly 4% were close to retirement age in 2004, which we define as 55 or older in 
2004 or over 65 years of age by 2015. Short Term attorneys make up 47.2% of the 
sample. Only 14.9% of the attorneys employed in 2004 were Long Term attorneys. 
Women were 30.0% of the sample. Only 6.7% of the SEC attorneys had been partners at 
NLJ 250 firms (NLJ 250 Prior Partner). In contrast, 17.5% of the SEC attorneys had 
served as a government attorney prior to joining the SEC (Prior Gov. Attorney). 
Attorneys were employed in regional or district offices (other than New York) made up 
43.9% of the sample. 
 
 Looking at responsibilities, Staff Attorneys make up 37.1% of the sample. This is 
an entry-level position for which individuals can be hired with minimal experience at a 
firm or other government agency. These attorneys do the bulk of the investigative work 
of the Division. Top Managers made up 22.9% of the sample. 
 
 Panel B of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the attorneys in our sample. 
We see that the SEC is a long term destination for many of the attorneys, with close to 
half (47.5%) still employed by the SEC as of 2016. Looking at the cases in which the 
attorneys are involved, the average attorney was listed as appearing in 0.145 cases per 
year and 0.081 Rule 10b-5 cases per year between 2004 and 2016. Other regulators (e.g., 
DOJ or state attorneys general) were involved in 9.2% of the cases. For the average 
attorney, 9.9% of the cases involved actions against individuals as well as a corporate 
defendant, and in 7.5% of the cases an officer resigned or was terminated as a result of 
the investigation. 
 
Looking at compensation and promotion, the average attorney in our sample got 
annual base pay increases of 5.5% (Average Base Pay % Change). In addition, they were 
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promoted 0.135 pay grades, on average, per year along the SEC pay scale that ranges 
from SK-1 to S-17 for employees and then SO-1 to SO-3 for Senior Officer positions 
(Promotion Rate).  
 
3.2 Who Succeeds at the SEC? 
How do long-term SEC employees compare with attorneys hired more recently? 
Are they equally effective, more effective a result of greater experience, or less effective 
because they have burned out? Consistent with H1, the “dead wood” hypothesis, we 
conjecture that Long Term staff attorneys are likely to underperform. We are also 
interested in comparing the performance of men and woman (Hypothesis H2). 
 
As our dependent variable for this analysis, we use the attorney’s average cases 
per year that include Rule 10b-5 allegations (10b-5 Cases). We treat an attorney as 
involved in a Rule 10b-5 case only if the complaint for the case lists the SEC attorney’s 
name. The SEC has a range of violations that it can allege against public companies, but 
only Rule 10b-5 allegations require proof of scienter. Other violations involving 
misleading disclosures can be premised on negligence or strict liability. Thus, Rule 10b-5 
cases are the ones that allege intentional wrongdoing, which makes them both more 
challenging to prove, but also arguably reflecting violations that cause investors greater 
damage. Our focus on complaints and SEC civil actions omits other activities of SEC 
attorneys including participation in administrative proceedings, investigations, 
rulemaking, and so on. Nonetheless, to the extent civil actions represent the highest 
profile activities of SEC attorneys, we expect that the highest performing SEC attorneys 
will be assigned to Rule 10b-5 civil actions. 
 
We estimate a regression model with 10b5 Cases as the dependent variables with 
robust standard errors. The base model (Model 1) is as follows: 
 
10b5 Casesi  = α  + ß1iShort Termi  +  ß2iLong Termi   
+  ß3iNLJ 250 Prior Partneri  +  ß4iPrior Gov. Attorneyi   
+  ß5iTop Law Schooli  + ß6iRegional Officei   
+  ß7iStaff Attorneyi  + ß8iTop Manageri   
+  ß9iFemalei  +  ß10iFemale x Staff Attorneyi   
+  ß11iFemale x Top Manageri  +  εi 
 
In Model 1, we include a number of independent variables. We include the 
indicator variable Long Term to examine whether longer-term SEC attorneys correlate 
with lower performance. We also include the indicator variable for Short Term to control 
for the possibility that individuals who are relatively early in their tenure may have fewer 
opportunities to work on the most significant cases. The baseline category for these 
regressions is attorneys who joined the agency between 1991 and 1999 (Medium Term). 
We include indicator variables for attorneys who were previously NLJ 250 Prior Partners, 
who may come to the agency with greater experience, as well as who were previously 
Prior Government Attorneys, who may also have greater experience with government 
enforcement actions. We include an indicator variable for Top Law School if the SEC 
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attorney went to one of the top 18 law schools as ranked by U.S. News and World Report 
in 1992 (Top Law School). We include the indicator variable for whether the SEC 
attorney is based in a Regional Office, which may have a different mix of cases. We 
include indicator variables for Staff Attorney, Top Manager, and Female attorney. We 
also include variables interacting Female with Staff Attorney and Top Manager. Table 2 
reports the results for Model 1. In Model 2, we replace those interaction terms with 
interaction variables for Female x Short Term and Female x Long Term. We present the 
results for Model 2 in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
In Models 1 and 2, note that the indicator variables for Short Term and Long 
Term are insignificant. We do not find any evidence that either Short Term or Long Term 
SEC attorneys are correlated with different performance compared with the base category 
of Medium Term SEC attorneys. 
  
 Looking at our control variables, attorneys in Regional Offices have fewer 10b-5 
cases (significant at the 5% levels in Models 1 and 2) as do Staff Attorneys (not 
significant however). The coefficient for Top Manager is positive and significant at the 
1% level in both models. This may reflect their supervisory responsibilities, which 
require them to be involved in more cases, while lower level attorneys may be putting 
more time into fewer individual cases.  
 
Looking at our gender variables, Female correlates with fewer 10b-5 cases in both 
of the models (significant at the 1% levels in Models 1 and 2). When we add interaction 
variables between Female and Staff Attorney and Female and Top Manager in Model 1, 
we find that females who are staff attorneys perform the same as males who are staff 
attorneys with respect to Rule 10b-5 cases.5  In contrast, females who are Top Managers 
tend to underperform males who are Top Managers for 10b-5 cases.6 Model 3 adds 
interactions between Female x Short Term and Female x Long Term. The sum of Female 
and Female x Short Term is not significantly different from zero, indicating that short 
term female attorneys participate in the same number of 10b-5 cases as short term male 
attorneys.7 Similarly, the sum of Female and Female x Long Term is not significantly 
different from zero.8 The underperformance of females for these cases is confined to the 
Medium Term female SEC attorneys. 
As a robustness test, we removed the indicator variables for Short Term and Long 
Term and interaction terms with Short Term and Long Term from Model 2 of Table 2 
and added Experience with an interaction variable between Experience and Female. 
Unreported, we found that the coefficient on Experience was not significant but the 
                                                 
5	The	sum	of	Female	and	Female	x	Staff	Attorney	in	Model	1	is	not	significantly	different	from	zero	(F‐
test	p‐value	=	0.8578).	
6	The	sum	of	Female	and	Female	x	Top	Manager	in	Model	1	is	negative	and	significant	at	the	1%	level	
(F‐test	p‐value	=	0.0027).	
7	The	sum	of	Female	and	Female	x	Short	Term	in	Model	2	is	not	significantly	different	from	zero	(F‐
test	p‐value	=	0.5629).	
8	The	sum	of	Female	and	Female	x	Long	Term	in	Model	2	is	not	significantly	different	from	zero	(F‐
test	p‐value	=	0.1874).	
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coefficient on Experience x Female was negative and significant at the 1% level, 
consistent with higher performance for more junior female SEC attorneys compared with 
more senior female SEC attorneys. 
 
We wanted to see if the relations identified from the regressions presented in 
Table 2 held for other potential measures of performance. Accordingly, we re-ran the 
regression specified in Model 2 of Table 2 with alternative dependent variables. We 
estimate regressions for four independent variables: 1) an OLS model using the number 
of SEC civil court cases for any cause of action as the dependent variable (Any Cases); 2) 
an OLS model using the number of SEC civil court cases for any cause of action in which 
an individual is named per year as the dependent variable (Individual Cases); 3) an OLS 
model using the number of SEC civil court cases in which another regulator brings 
charges per year as the dependent variable (Other Regulator); 4) an OLS model using the 
number of SEC civil court cases in which an officer resigns as the dependent variable 
(Officer Resignations). The independent variables are the same as those used in the 
Model 1 presented in Table 2. We present the results of these estimations in Panel A of 
Table 3. We also used the same independent variables as those used in Model 2 of Table 
2 and present the results in Panel B of Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We do not see a consistent pattern for these metrics of performance, with a couple 
of exceptions. The coefficient for Long Term is negative and significant at the 10% level 
in two of the four models (Any Cases and Individual Cases) in both Panels A and B of 
Table 3, offering some support to Hypothesis 1. We also find a significant negative 
coefficient for Staff Attorney in three of the four models (Any Cases, Individuals, and 
Officer Resignations) in Panel A and two of the four models (Individuals and Officer 
Resignations) in Panel B. Staff Attorneys are less likely to be involved in these cases with 
significant consequences for culpable individuals. In both Panel A and Panel B, SEC 
attorneys from Regional Offices tend to underperform in three of the four models (Any 
Cases, Individual Cases, and Other Regulator). As in Table 2, Top Managers outperform 
in all the models of Panels A and B. 
 
In contrast to the results presented in Table 2, the coefficient for Female is 
significant in only one of the four models in Panel A of Table 3 (Individual Cases; 
negative and significant at the 10% level). Moreover, the interaction terms between 
Female and Staff Attorney are insignificant in all the models and the interaction term 
between Female and Top Manager is significant in only one of the four models of Panel 
A (Individual Cases; negative and significant at the 10% level). We find stronger results 
in Panel B where Female is negative and significant at the 1% level in all four models. 
The interaction term between Female and Short Term is positive and significant at the 1% 
level in all four models and the sum of Female and Female x Short Term is not 
significantly different from zero.9 The interaction term between Female and Long Term 
is also positive in all four models but not significant and the sum of Female and Female x 
                                                 
9	The	p‐values	for	the	F‐test	of	the	sum	of	Female	and	Female	x	Short	Term	are	as	follows:	Model	1	p‐
value	=	0.2679;	Model	2	p‐value=0.5620;	Model	3	p‐value	=	0.3431;	and	Model	4	p‐value	=	0.6099.	
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Long Term is not significantly different from zero.10 As in Table 2, the results from Panel 
B indicate that although relatively new hire female SEC attorneys perform at the same 
level of new hire male SEC attorneys, Medium Term females tend to underperform 
Medium Term male SEC attorneys. We conclude that there is some evidence that 
contradicts Hypothesis #2 particularly for the Medium Term attorneys at the SEC. 
 
3.3  Who Gets Paid and Promoted at the SEC? 
 
 We next look at the pattern of pay raises at the SEC. Attorneys at different stages 
in their career at the SEC may experience different patterns of pay and promotion. We 
focus our analysis only on the Short Term SEC attorneys to compare attorneys at roughly 
the same point in their careers. Focusing on Short Term SEC attorneys also allows us to 
consider whether gender differences exist in pay and promotion among newly hired SEC 
attorneys as they pursue their career at the SEC. 
 
Our first focus is on the annual percentage change in base salary for the attorneys 
in our sample (Average Pay % Increase) measured from 2004 to 2014 or the last year the 
attorney was employed at the SEC. We estimate the following regression model with 
robust standard errors.  
 
Average Pay % Increasei  = α  + ß1iNLJ 250 Prior Partneri   
+  ß2iPrior Gov. Attorneyi  +  ß3iTop Law Schooli   
+  ß4iRegional Officei  +  ß5iStaff Attorneyi   
+  ß6iTop Manageri  +  ß7iFemalei  +  εi 
 
We include independent variables for NLJ 250 Prior Partner, Prior Government 
Attorney, Top Law School, Regional Office, Staff Attorney, Top Manager, and Female to 
assess the relationship between the various attorney characteristic variables and pay 
increases at the SEC. We present the results of these estimations in Model 1 of Table 4. 
 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 We see that SEC attorneys who work in a Regional Office receive lower pay 
increases over time compared with SEC attorneys working either in Washington DC or 
New York City (coefficient on Regional Office negative and significant at the 5% level). 
We also find that those newly hired SEC attorneys who are a Staff Attorney in 2004 are 
more likely to receive a pay increase (coefficient on Staff Attorney positive and 
significant at the 1% level), likely because they start at a much lower salary than 
attorneys who start at a higher level than Staff Attorney. Lastly, note that the coefficient 
on Female is negative and significant at the 10% level. All other things being equal, 
newly hired female SEC attorneys receive lower pay increases over time compared with 
newly hired male SEC attorneys. These results stand in sharp contrast to the results in 
Tables 2 and 3, which showed that, if anything, recently hired women outperformed their 
male counterparts. These results suggest that newly-arrived female attorneys were being 
                                                 
10	The	p‐values	for	the	F‐test	of	the	sum	of	Female	and	Female	x	Long	Term	are	as	follows:	Model	1	p‐
value	=	0.3267;	Model	2	p‐value=0.2483;	Model	3	p‐value	=	0.5231;	and	Model	4	p‐value	=	0.1782.	
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given challenging assignments, but not receiving pay increases commensurate with that 
effort.  
 
 We also looked at bonuses. The SEC may have greater discretionary ability to 
reward high performance through bonus payments instead of base pay changes. For this 
analysis, we used the ratio of bonus to base salary for the year 2014 or the SEC attorneys 
last year at the SEC (Bonus Ratio) as our dependent variable. We use the same 
independent variables as in Model 1 of Table 4 and report the in Model 2 of Table 4. 
Unlike Model 1, we do not find evidence that female SEC attorneys receive any different 
bonuses compared with male SEC attorneys.  
 
Finally, we looked at who was promoted in the Enforcement Division. For this 
analysis, we use Promotion Rate as our dependent variable and our independent variables 
are the same as used in the estimations presented in Table 2. We use the same 
independent variables as in Model 1 of Table 4 and report the in Model 3 of Table 4. We 
present the results in Model 3 of Table 4. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Staff Attorneys are promoted a higher rate; there is more room to 
move up. The coefficient for this variable is positive and significant at the 1% level. We 
also find evidence that female SEC attorneys who are Short Term as of 2004 are less 
likely to get promoted compared with male SEC attorneys who are Short Term. The 
coefficient on Female is negative and significant at the 10% level. 
 
3.4 Who Leaves the SEC? 
 
 We next look at who leaves the SEC, which we define as being no longer 
employed by the SEC in 2016. Recall from Table 1 that 48% of the attorneys employed 
by the Division in 2004 were still there in 2016, so slightly over half of the attorneys 
employed in 2004 had departed by the end of our sample period.  
 
For our test, we employ a Cox proportional hazard model. Our dependent variable 
is leaving the SEC (1=left the SEC in any given year) from 2004 to 2016. The Cox 
proportional hazard model we estimate is as follows: 
 
h(t, X) = h0(t)ex'β 
 
In the Cox hazard model, h(t, X) is the hazard rate. The Cox model is 
semiparametric and does not require us to make assumptions about the baseline hazard 
rate, h0(t). In the Cox model, X represents the vector of regressors and β is a vector of 
estimated coefficients. For our first model (Model 1), we include variables for the 
number of years the attorney has spent at the SEC (Experience) and an indicator variable 
for whether the SEC attorney is age 55 or older as of 2004 (Close to Retire). These 
variables control for the increased tendency of those with more experience and those 
closer to retirement to leave the SEC. We also include variables Female, NLJ 250 Prior 
Partner, Prior Government Attorney, Top Law School, Regional Office, Staff Attorney, 
and Top Manager. We posit that partners are large law firms (Prior NLJ 250 Prior 
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Partner) are likely to be coming to the SEC to burnish their credentials and are unlikely to 
stay. Attorneys in Regional offices may have fewer attractive employment opportunities 
because they are typically outside the major financial centers. Moreover, the cost of 
living in those cities may be more manageable. (Some former attorneys that we spoke to 
discussed the difficulty of sending children to college on a government lawyer’s salary on 
top of the cost of living in New York or Washington.) The management experience of 
attorneys in the Top Manager role may make them more attractive to outside employers; 
conversely, the limited responsibilities of Staff Attorneys may make them less attractive. 
We report the results in Model 1 of Table 5.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Not surprisingly, those SEC attorneys who are close to retirement are more likely 
to depart from the SEC. In Model 1 of Table 5, the coefficient on Close to Retire is 
positive and significant at the 10% level. In Model 1, those close to retirement have a 
99.5% greater likelihood of departing the SEC compared with those who are not close to 
retirement. Those who were a NLJ 250 Prior Partner are more likely to depart the SEC 
(with a 67.5% increase in the probability of departure) and those who are top managers 
are also more likely to depart (with a 75.2% increase in the probability of departure). 
SEC attorneys at a Regional Office are 24.6% less likely to depart compared with SEC 
attorneys in Washington DC or New York City.  
 
Turning to gender, the coefficient for Female is negative and significant in Model 
1. Female SEC attorneys have a 26.4% lower likelihood of departing the SEC compared 
with male SEC attorneys. To examine whether the propensity of female SEC attorneys 
relative to male SEC attorneys to leave the SEC changes with experience, we add 
interaction terms between Female x Experience and Female x Close to Retire to Model 1 
and report the results in Model 2 of Table 5. 
 
In Model 2, note that the interaction term between Female and Experience is 
above 1, indicating that while female SEC attorneys are less likely to depart the SEC 
compared with male attorneys, this differential narrows as female attorneys spend more 
time at the SEC. The coefficients in Model 2 indicate that female attorneys with more 
than 18 years at the SEC become more likely to depart the SEC compared with their male 
counterparts. This pattern offers some support to Hypothesis #3 suggesting that gender 
has an important interaction with age and time at the SEC in determining likelihood of 
leaving the SEC. This pattern lends support to the supposition that family obligations 
may affect career choices for the women in our sample. Women are more likely to stay, 
but not women who have been in the Division the longest. 
 
As a robustness test of the relationship of gender for newly hired SEC attorneys 
and the likelihood of departure we re-estimated Model 1 only for the Short Term SEC 
attorneys as of 2004 and omit Close to Retire from the model. Unreported, the coefficient 
for Female in the model is less than 1 (0.601) and significant at the 5% level. Short Term 
female SEC attorneys are 39.9% less likely to depart the SEC compared with Short Term 
male SEC attorneys in any given year from 2004 to 2016. 
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In order to assess the effect of performance on likelihood of departure, we 
compute our measures of performance (10b-5 Cases, Any Cases, Individual Cases, Other 
Regulator, and Officer Resignations) up to the end of 2010 for each SEC attorney. We 
then estimate a hazard model with leaving the SEC as our dependent variable (1=left the 
SEC in any given year) for those SEC attorneys who are still attorneys as of the end of 
2010. The base model includes as independent variables for Experience, Close to Retire, 
and Female. Due to possible collinearity between other attorney characteristics (NLJ 250 
Prior Partner, Prior Gov. Attorney, Top Law School, Regional Office, Staff Attorney, and 
Top Manager) and our measures of performance we omit these other attorney 
characteristic variables from the base model. We report the base model as Model 1of 
Table 6. In separate models reported in Table 6, we add to the base model 10b-5 Cases as 
an independent variable (Model 1), Any Cases (Model 2), Other Regulator (Model 3), 
Individual Cases (Model 4), and Officer Resignations (Model 5).  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In Model 1, the coefficient for 10b-5 Cases is greater than 1 and significant at the 
one percent level. Attorneys involved with more 10b-5 cases are more likely to leave the 
SEC. Similarly, in the other models, the coefficients on Any Cases, Other Regulator, and 
Individual Cases are all greater than 1, indicating that higher performance is correlated 
with a greater propensity to leave the SEC. 
 
Overall, these results are inconsistent with the “revolving door” hypothesis that 
posits that attorneys may go soft in enforcement actions to curry favor with outside 
employers. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. Consistent with Hypothesis #6, 
attorneys who produce tangible results for the agency appear to be more likely to have 
attractive outside employment options. 
 
3.5 Who Goes Where? 
 Our last set of regressions explores the destinations of enforcement attorneys who 
leave the division. We divide the sample of departing attorneys into several categories. 
The base category consists of attorneys who remain at the SEC as of 2016. The remainder 
are divided into six categories: 1) Private Practice, Associate or Counsel; 2) Private 
Practice, Partner; 3) Financial or Compliance Industry; 4) Non-Profit or Academia; 5) 
Other Government; and 6) Retirement or Non-Legal/Compliance Industry. We posit that 
our first three categories, attorneys who leave the SEC to become associates or partners 
in law firms or a position in the financial services industry, are motivated, at least in part, 
by monetary returns. The latter three categories are consistent with individuals who are 
not motivated primarily by financial rewards. We use these categories as the dependent 
variable in a single multinomial logit model with the base category for each being 
remaining at the SEC, so each of the six columns represents a different type of leaving 
the SEC and each is compared pairwise with staying at the SEC. The multinomial logit 
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model is as follows:  
 
Prob(Employment Type After SEC)i  = α  + ß1iExperiencei   
+  ß2iClose to Retirei  +  ß3iFemalei   
+  ß4iExperience x Femalei   
+  ß5iClose to Retire x Femalei   
  +  ß6iNLJ 250 Prior Partneri   +  ß7iPrior Gov. Attorneyi 
+  ß8iTop Law Schooli  +  ß9iRegional Officei   
+  ß10iStaff Attorneyi  +  ß11iTop Manageri  +  εi 
 
The independent variables are the same as Model 2 of Table 5. We present the 
results in Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 We see that experience does not correlate with securing highly paid employment 
after leaving the SEC. The coefficient for Experience is negative and significant for the 
Private Practice Partner and Financial or Compliance Industry categories, while it is 
positive and significant for the Retirement or Non-Legal/Compliance category.  
 
 Focusing on gender differences, women are less likely to leave to become 
partners at law firms or work in the financial industry or in compliance, so they are not 
securing the highest-paid post-SEC employment. This offers some support for 
Hypothesis #4. This relation is mitigated, however, for women with more experience. 
This suggests that younger women are either less interested or less successful in securing 
these highly-paid positions after leaving the SEC, but that is not true for older women.  
 We find other significant correlations for Staff Attorneys: they are significantly 
less likely to become law firm partners and significantly more likely to head for the last 
category, Retirement or Non-Legal/Compliance. (This category includes one attorney 
who became a therapist). By contrast, Top Manager is positive and significant for the 
Private Practice, Partner and Financial or Compliance Industry categories. This 
correlation suggests that top level experience at the SEC is a marketable credential when 
seeking employment in the private sector. The opportunities for attorneys departing the 
Regional Offices are more limited. We find negative and significant coefficients for the 
Private Practice, Partner and Financial or Compliance Industry categories, as well as the 
Other Government category. Presumably that last category is a more popular destination 
for attorneys in the Washington, DC office. Serving as a government attorney before 
joining the SEC (Prior Government Attorney) is positively correlated with becoming an 
attorney with another government entity after leaving the SEC. 
 
Our last set of tests looks at the relation between performance at the SEC and 
destination upon departure from the SEC. We compute our measures of performance 
(10b-5 Cases, Any Cases, Individual Cases, Other Regulator, and Officer Resignations) 
up to the end of 2010 for each SEC attorney. We then estimate a multinomial logit model 
using the same destination categories as in Table 7 with staying at the SEC as the base 
category only for those SEC attorneys who were still at the SEC at the end of 2010. The 
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base multinomial logit model is as follows: 
 
Prob(Employment Type After SEC)i  = α  + ß1iExperiencei   
+  ß2iClose to Retirei  +  ß3iFemalei   
+  ß4i10b-5 Casesi +  εi 
 
In the base model (Model 1) we include independent variables for Experience and 
Close to Retire to test the importance of tenure at the SEC as well as the prospect of 
retirement on the destination of a person who leaves the SEC. We also include an 
indicator variable for Female to test the importance of gender. We include 10b-5 Cases as 
the performance measure. We do not include the other independent variables from the 
multinomial logit model of Table 7 because of possible collinearity with the difference 
performance measures. In separate models, we replace 10b-5 Cases with the following 
performance measure variables: Any Cases (Model 2), Other Regulator (Model 3), 
Individual Cases (Model 4), and Officer Resignations (Model 5) as independent 
variables. In Table 8 we report only the coefficients for the performance variables from 
the multinomial logit models.  
 
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
 
The coefficients for the performance variables are all positive and significantly 
related to Private Practice Partner. This result, in conjunction with the results from Table 
7, suggests that departures from the SEC are not only correlated with performance, but 
that the departure is related to a high-paying destination after leaving the SEC. This 
offers additional support to Hypothesis #6. The performance coefficients are generally 
insignificant in relation to other destinations, with the exception of Other Regulator, 
which is positive and significantly related to Non-Profit or Academia, albeit only at the 
10% level. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 What is the career path of an SEC enforcement attorney?  Our paper provides 
evidence that longer term SEC attorneys tend to underperform other SEC attorneys, 
consistent with the hypothesis that higher performers may leave the SEC before 
becoming a long termer. We find evidence that the higher performers at the SEC are 
more likely to depart the SEC, consistent with the Long Term SEC attorneys correlating 
with underperforming attorneys. 
 
 We also find gender matters for the career trajectory of attorneys at the SEC. 
Among the group of relative new hires as of 2004 (Short Term SEC attorneys), we find 
that women and men perform equally well at the SEC. Nonetheless, when we look at how 
Short Term SEC attorneys progress in their careers at the SEC after 2004, we find that 
women tend to get lower pay increases and fewer promotions. One explanation for this 
differential is that women tend to be less likely to leave the SEC at least initially in their 
careers. When women do leave the SEC, they tend to go to lower paid positions, less 
likely to end up in private practice partnership and financial or compliance industry jobs 
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after the SEC. To the extent the threat of departure, particularly to a higher paying job, 
may lead the SEC to offer higher compensation and greater promotions to retain an 
attorney, the decreased willingness to depart on the part of female SEC attorneys may 
lead to lower pay and fewer promotions.  
 
  
20
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 127 [2017]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/127
Choi & Pritchard  Page 20 
 
References 
 
Boylan, R.T. (2004) “Salaries, Turnover, and Performance in the Federal Criminal Justice 
System,” 47 J. of Law & Econ. 75-92. 
 
Boylan, R.T. (2005) “What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of 
U.S. Attorneys,” 7 Am. Law & Econ. Review 379-402. 
 
Boylan, R. T. & C.X. Long (2005) “Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of 
Federal Prosecutors,” 48 J. of Law & Econ. 627-651. 
 
Choi, S. & A.C. Pritchard (2017) “Securities Law and its Enforcers,”  
  
DeHaan, E., S Kedia, K. Koh, & S. Rajgopal (2016) “Does the Revolving Door Affect 
the SEC’s Enforcement Outcomes,” J. of Accounting & Econ. 
 
Dixon, J. & C. Seron (1995) “Stratification in the Legal Profession: Sex, Sector, and 
Salary,” 29 Law & Society Review 381-412. 
 
Goddeeris, J.H. (1988) “Compensating Differentials and Self-Selection: An Application 
to Lawyers,” 96 J. of Pol. Econ. 411-428. 
 
Hagan, J. (1990) “The Gender Stratification of Income Inequality among Lawyers,” 68 
Social Forces 835-855. 
 
NALP Foundation for Law Career Research and Education (NALP) and the American 
Bar Foundation (ABF), (2004) “After the JD: First Results of a National Study of Legal 
Careers,” NALP Foundation and ABA Foundation, available at 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/publications/AftertheJD/AJD_Publications.html. 
 
NALP Foundation for Law Career Research and Education (NALP) and the American 
Bar Foundation (ABF) (2009) “After the JD II: Second Results of a National Study of 
Legal Careers,” NALP Foundation and ABA Foundation, available at 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/publications/AftertheJD/AJD_Publications.html. 
 
Rebitzer, J.B. & L.T. Taylor, “Efficiency Wages and Employment Rents: The Employer-
Size Wage Effect in the Job Market for Lawyers,” 13 J. of Labor Econ. 678-708. 
 
Rosen, S. (1992) “The Market for Lawyers,” 35 J. of Law & Economics 215-246. 
 
Sauer, R.M. (1998) “Job Mobility and the Market for Lawyers,” 106 J. of Pol. Econ. 147-
171. 
 
Smallberg, M. (2011), “Revolving Regulators: SEC Faces Ethics Challenges with 
Revolving Door,” Project On Government Oversight Report, available at 
http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2011/fo-fra-20110513.html. 
21
Pritchard and Choi:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2017
Choi & Pritchard  Page 21 
 
 
Sterling, J.S. & N. Reichman (2016) “Overlooked and Undervalued: Women in Private 
Law Practice,” 12 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 373-393. 
 
Weisbrod, B.A. (1983) “Nonprofit and Proprietary Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials 
among Lawyers,” 1 J. of Labor Economics 246-263.  
22
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 127 [2017]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/127
Choi & Pritchard  Page 22 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Enforcement Division Attorneys 
 
Panel A:  Full Sample Measured in 2004 
Variable N Mean Median SD 
Experience 406 13.9 13 7.169 
Close to Retire 406 0.037 0 0.189 
Short Term 417 0.472 0 0.500 
Long Term 417 0.149 0 0.356 
Female 417 0.300 0 0.459 
NLJ 250 Prior Partner 359 0.067 0 0.250 
Prior Gov. Attorney 359 0.175 0 0.381 
Top Law School 410 0.456 0 0.499 
Regional 417 0.439 0 0.497 
Staff Attorney 410 0.371 0 0.484 
Top Manager 410 0.229 0 0.421 
 
Panel B:  Full Sample Variables Based on 2004 to 2015 data 
Variable N Mean Median SD 
SEC 2016 413 0.475 0 0.500 
10b-5 Cases 417 0.081 0 0.169 
Any Cases 417 0.145 0 0.322 
Individual Actions 417 0.099 0 0.202 
Other Government 197 0.092 0 0.170 
Officer Resignations 417 0.075 0 0.154 
Average Base Pay Change % 394 0.055 0.051 0.022 
Bonus Ratio 397 0.008 0.003 0.013 
Promotions Per Year 374 0.135 0 0.228 
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Table 2:  Who Performs Well at the SEC? 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 10b-5 Cases 10b-5 Cases 
Short Term 0.00183 -0.0185 
 (0.12) (-0.93) 
   
Long Term -0.0354 -0.0485 
 (-1.16) (-1.20) 
   
NLJ 250 Prior Partner 0.0272 0.0233 
 (0.61) (0.51) 
   
Prior Gov. Attorney -0.0160 -0.0172 
 (-0.87) (-0.94) 
   
Top Law School -0.00547 -0.00263 
 (-0.34) (-0.17) 
   
Regional Office -0.0426* -0.0420* 
 (-2.45) (-2.40) 
   
Staff Attorney -0.0258 -0.0166 
 (-1.53) (-1.20) 
   
Top Manager 0.116** 0.0960** 
 (3.05) (3.25) 
   
Female -0.0427** -0.0829** 
 (-2.77) (-3.82) 
   
Female x 0.0392  
Staff Attorney (1.59)  
   
Female x -0.0736+  
Top Manager (-1.78)  
   
Female x  0.0728* 
Short Term  (2.58) 
   
Female x  0.0301 
Long Term  (0.66) 
   
Constant 0.0981** 0.110** 
 (5.58) (5.27) 
N 353 353 
Adj R2 0.096 0.091 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3:  Who Performs Well at the SEC? Alternative Metrics 
Panel A 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Any Cases Individual 
Cases 
Other 
Regulator 
Officer 
Resignations 
Short Term 0.0308 0.00403 0.0126 0.0156 
 (1.23) (0.23) (0.61) (1.12) 
     
Long Term -0.0821+ -0.0587+ -0.0232 -0.0322 
 (-1.93) (-1.69) (-0.49) (-1.16) 
     
NLJ 250 Prior  0.0103 0.00487 0.0140 -0.0109 
Partner (0.18) (0.13) (0.37) (-0.40) 
     
Prior Gov.  -0.0312 -0.0280 0.000173 -0.0213 
Attorney (-1.02) (-1.28) (0.01) (-1.28) 
     
Top Law School -0.0115 -0.00322 0.00425 0.00734 
 (-0.45) (-0.17) (0.23) (0.51) 
     
Regional Office -0.0885** -0.0452* -0.0683** -0.0203 
 (-3.12) (-2.18) (-3.38) (-1.27) 
     
Staff Attorney -0.0470+ -0.0377* -0.00490 -0.0287* 
 (-1.81) (-2.01) (-0.25) (-1.97) 
     
Top Manager 0.210** 0.146** 0.115** 0.105** 
 (3.40) (3.21) (3.02) (3.06) 
     
Female -0.0285 -0.0342+ 0.0279 -0.0158 
 (-0.81) (-1.71) (0.64) (-0.92) 
     
Female x 0.0511 0.0422 -0.0337 0.0159 
Staff Attorney (1.10) (1.43) (-0.67) (0.70) 
     
Female x -0.119+ -0.0867+ -0.0785 -0.0808* 
Top Manager (-1.68) (-1.73) (-1.16) (-2.04) 
     
Constant 0.154** 0.115** 0.0813** 0.0704** 
 (5.20) (5.38) (3.76) (4.46) 
N 353 353 165 353 
Adj R2 0.101 0.097 0.118 0.073 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Panel B 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Any Cases Individual 
Cases 
Other Regulator Officer 
Resignations 
Short Term -0.0138 -0.0258 -0.0133 -0.00585 
 (-0.45) (-1.10) (-0.59) (-0.32) 
     
Long Term -0.108* -0.0756+ -0.0584 -0.0422 
 (-1.97) (-1.68) (-1.09) (-1.17) 
     
NLJ 250 Prior  0.0029 -0.0004 0.0063 -0.0144 
Partner (0.05) (-0.01) (0.17) (-0.51) 
     
Prior Gov.  -0.0344 -0.0301 -0.0054 -0.0221 
Attorney (-1.12) (-1.38) (-0.19) (-1.33) 
     
Top Law School -0.0083 -0.0005 0.0056 0.0094 
 (-0.33) (-0.03) (0.31) (0.64) 
     
Regional Office -0.0865** -0.0439* -0.0693** -0.0193 
 (-3.07) (-2.12) (-3.52) (-1.20) 
     
Staff Attorney -0.0376 -0.0289+ -0.0141 -0.0265* 
 (-1.53) (-1.83) (-0.70) (-2.11) 
     
Top Manager 0.176** 0.122** 0.0963** 0.0826** 
 (3.66) (3.44) (3.05) (3.07) 
     
Female -0.119** -0.0936** -0.0826** -0.0656** 
 (-3.40) (-3.51) (-2.72) (-3.09) 
     
Female x 0.156** 0.106** 0.107** 0.0737** 
Short Term (3.17) (3.10) (2.73) (2.77) 
     
Female x 0.0628 0.0403 0.139 0.0170 
Long Term (0.94) (0.76) (1.47) (0.41) 
     
Constant 0.183** 0.134** 0.107** 0.0858** 
 (5.21) (5.36) (4.41) (4.87) 
N 353 353 165 353 
adj. R2 0.106 0.098 0.141 0.072 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4:  Raises, Bonuses, and Promotions at the SEC  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Average Pay % 
Increase 
Bonus Ratio Promotion Rate 
NLJ 250 Prior  -0.0130+ -0.00551* -0.0269 
Partner (-1.68) (-1.98) (-0.36) 
    
Prior Gov.  -0.0068 -0.0020 -0.0667 
Attorney (-1.57) (-1.00) (-1.56) 
    
Top Law School 0.0028 -0.0015 0.0463 
 (0.74) (-0.83) (1.19) 
    
Regional Office -0.0073* -0.0006 0.0125 
 (-2.00) (-0.34) (0.35) 
    
Staff Attorney 0.0121** -0.0016 0.105** 
 (3.41) (-0.84) (2.96) 
    
Top Manager 0.000646 0.00759 0.119 
 (0.08) (0.93) (1.21) 
    
Female -0.0069+ - 0.0001 -0.0684+ 
 (-1.86) (-0.06) (-1.80) 
    
Constant 0.0630** 0.00918** 0.119** 
 (15.83) (3.40) (3.25) 
N 167 173 167 
r2_a 0.093 0.007 0.036 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5:  Hazard Models for Who Leaves the SEC? 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Experience 0.989 0.976 
 (-0.72) (-1.44) 
   
Close to Retire 1.995+ 2.770* 
 (1.82) (2.27) 
   
Female 0.736+ 0.378* 
 (-1.77) (-2.33) 
   
Experience x  1.055+ 
Female  (1.88) 
   
Close to Retire x  0.427 
Female  (-0.96) 
   
NLJ 250 Prior Partner 1.675+ 1.744+ 
 (1.84) (1.94) 
   
Prior Gov. Attorney 1.042 1.056 
 (0.21) (0.27) 
   
Top Law School 1.146 1.151 
 (0.92) (0.95) 
   
Regional Office 0.754+ 0.739+ 
 (-1.80) (-1.92) 
   
Staff Attorney 1.181 1.181 
 (0.81) (0.80) 
   
Top Manager 1.762** 1.760** 
 (3.01) (2.98) 
N 352 352 
pseudo R2 0.011 0.013 
ll -1024.0 -1022.1 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6:  Hazard Models of Who Leaves the SEC? Performance Measures 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Experience 0.941** 0.940** 0.941** 0.941** 0.941** 
 (-2.68) (-2.73) (-2.67) (-2.69) (-2.68) 
      
Close to Retire 9.486** 9.427** 8.544** 8.386** 8.382** 
 (3.15) (3.14) (3.03) (3.03) (3.01) 
      
Female 0.473* 0.430** 0.453* 0.430** 0.458* 
 (-2.37) (-2.65) (-2.51) (-2.64) (-2.48) 
      
10b-5 Cases 1.265**     
 (2.85)     
      
Any Cases  1.138**    
  (3.26)    
      
Other Regulator    1.141+   
   (1.89)   
      
Individual Cases    1.385**  
    (3.42)  
      
Officer Resignations     1.149 
     (1.55) 
      
N 260 260 260 260 260 
pseudo R2 0.030 0.030 0.025 0.032 0.024 
ll -343.9 -343.7 -345.7 -343.2 -346.1 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 7:  Where Do They Go? 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Private Practice 
Associate or 
Counsel 
Private Practice 
Partner 
Financial or 
Compliance 
Industry 
Non-Profit or 
Academia 
Other Government Retirement or Non-
Legal/Compliance 
Experience -0.0827 -0.0785+ -0.204** 0.0824 -0.157* 0.230** 
 (-1.31) (-1.95) (-3.81) (0.73) (-2.11) (2.73) 
       
Close to Retire 2.402 1.157 -24.28 -25.51 -24.96 1.761 
 (1.50) (0.94) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (1.23) 
       
Female 1.405 -3.213* -2.711** 1.190 -0.493 0.570 
 (1.15) (-2.44) (-2.97) (0.50) (-0.43) (0.25) 
       
Experience x -0.265+ 0.141+ 0.183** -0.0113 0.0800 0.0087 
Female (-1.71) (1.82) (2.61) (-0.08) (0.93) (0.07) 
       
Close to Retire x -26.44 -28.60 -3.332 -0.625 -3.353 -0.400 
Female (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.15) 
       
NLJ 250 Prior  1.002 1.087 0.940 -14.83 2.940** -0.662 
Partner (0.81) (1.64) (1.02) (-0.01) (3.30) (-0.47) 
       
Prior Gov.  0.452 -0.375 0.636 -15.28 1.673** -0.155 
Attorney (0.61) (-0.75) (1.31) (-0.01) (2.58) (-0.19) 
       
Top Law School -0.411 -0.229 0.394 1.383 0.666 0.0241 
 (-0.80) (-0.67) (1.12) (1.50) (1.30) (0.03) 
       
Regional Office 0.660 -0.681+ -0.705+ -0.505 -0.640 -1.216 
 (1.24) (-1.96) (-1.86) (-0.55) (-1.17) (-1.53) 
       
Staff Attorney 0.133 -1.163* 0.179 15.13 0.216 3.160* 
 (0.21) (-2.25) (0.39) (0.01) (0.33) (2.32) 
       
Top Manager -0.183 1.446** 1.056+ 16.78 0.738 2.510* 
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 (-0.21) (3.56) (1.93) (0.02) (0.92) (2.31) 
       
Constant -1.176 0.738 1.176 -20.25 -1.193 -8.474** 
 (-1.18) (1.15) (1.60) (-0.02) (-1.11) (-3.88) 
N      318 
pseudo R2      0.196 
ll      -395.4 
Z statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8:  Where Do They Go? Performance Measures 
 
Performance N Pseudo 
R2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable (Measured from 
2005 to 2010 
  Private 
Practice 
Associate or 
Counsel 
Private 
Practice 
Partner 
Financial or 
Compliance 
Industry 
Non-Profit or 
Academia 
Other 
Government 
Retirement or 
Non-
Legal/Compli
ance 
(Model 1) 10b-5 Cases 220 0.1848 0.436 0.558** 0.024 0.321 0.209 -12.812 
   (1.20) (3.56) (0.08) (0.65) (0.43) (0.99) 
         
(Model 2) Any Cases 220 0.1788 0.194 0.290** -0.157 0.197 0.086 0.101 
   (0.74) (2.85) (-0.63) (0.96) (0.46) (0.33) 
         
(Model 3) Other Regulator 220 0.1811 -0.043 0.731** -0.293 0.696+ 0.071 0.780 
   (-0.05) (2.96) (-0.57) (1.94) (0.14) (1.48) 
         
(Model 4) Individual Cases 220 0.1746 0.369 0.393** -0.222 0.157 0.159 -0.491 
   (1.38) (2.98) (-0.66) (0.34) (0.71) (-0.62) 
         
(Model 5) Officer 
Resignations 220 0.1763 0.273 0.454** -0.196 0.242 0.102 -14.002 
   (0.66) (2.93) (-0.55) (0.49) (0.34) (-0.01) 
z statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Each row reports the coefficient on a performance variable from the following multinomial logit 
model (with staying at the SEC as the base category): 
 
Prob(Employment Type After SEC)i  = α  + ß1iExperiencei  +  ß2iClose to Retirei  +  ß3iFemalei  +  ß4i[Performance Measure]i +  εi 
 
The performance variables are measured from 2005 to 2010 and the model is estimated only for individuals who still are at the SEC in 2010.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Experience Equals 2004 minus the Law School Graduation Year for a particular 
attorney. 
  
Close to Retire Indicator variable for individuals who are age 55 or older in 2004. 
  
Short Term Employed by the SEC in 2000 or later. 
  
Long Term Employed by the SEC in 1990 or earlier. 
  
Female Coded as 1 for women and 0 for men. 
  
NLJ 250 Prior Partner 
 
Partner at one of the 250 largest law firms in the US, as ranked by the 
National Law Journal, before coming to the SEC. 
  
Prior Government Employed as a government attorney prior to joining the SEC. 
  
Top Law School Coded as 1 for top 18 law schools as ranked by U.S. News and World 
Report in 1992. 
  
Regional Office Indicator variable coded as 1 if employed in a regional or district 
office and 0 if employed in Washington, DC or New York.  
  
Staff Attorney Employed by the SEC at SK-14 or below. 
  
Top Manager Employed by the SEC at SK-17 and above. These attorneys typically 
have the title of Assistant Director, Assistant District Administrator, 
or Assistant Regional Director, or higher. 
  
SEC 2016 Still employed by the SEC in June 2016. 
  
10b-5 Cases Average number of Rule 10b-5 cases per year (2004-2015) in which 
attorney appeared. 
 
Any Cases Number of court cases per year (2004-2015) in which individual is 
listed as counsel. 
  
Individual Actions Average number of cases per year (2004-2015) in which an 
individual was named as a defendant in which attorney appeared. 
  
Other Government Average number of cases per year (2004-2015) in which individual 
appeared that also involved an investigation by another government 
agency.  
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Officer Resignations Average number of cases per year (2004-2015) in which individual 
appeared which lead to the resignation of an officer of the issuer. 
  
Average Base Pay 
Change % 
Average percentage increase in base pay for the SEC attorney from 
2004 to 2014 or the last year the SEC attorney was employed at the 
SEC if earlier than 2014. 
  
Bonus Ratio Ratio of bonus to base pay in 2014 or computed for the last year the 
SEC attorney was employed at the SEC if earlier than 2014. 
  
Promotions Per Year Average number of ranks the SEC attorney is promoted per year from 
2004 to 2014 or the last year the SEC attorney was employed at the 
SEC if earlier than 2014. Ranks are determined based on the SEC’s 
SK-1 through SK-17 and then SO-1 to SO-3 ranking system (with 
one step up the ranks equal to 1 in the computation). 
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